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Articles
Islamic State and Al-Nusra: Exploring Determinants of Chemical 
Weapons Usage Patterns
by Geoffrey Chapman
 
Abstract
This article seeks to examine the determinants of use and non-use of chemical weapons between two typologically 
similar non-state actors. By comparing the differing patterns of chemical weapons usage exhibited by the Islamic 
State and Al-Nusra against commonly offered variables for drivers of non-state actor CBRN usage, it will be 
determined that they both share the ability to conduct basic chemical weapons attacks and have the same retaliatory 
and theological justifications to do so. However, the essential difference between the two groups that provides an 
explanation for the difference in chemical weapons usage can be found in the constraints (or lack thereof) imposed 
by their respective strategies. The formation of these approaches by their precursor organisations combined with 
their prior CBRN behaviour will provide further evidence to this conclusion. 
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Introduction
Within the ongoing conflict in Syria and its spill over into Iraq, chemical weapons (CW) have become a salient 
point of international reaction. While much of the focus of the international community has been concerned 
with the response to the Assad regime’s use of CW, Islamic State (IS) has also been a prolific user of CW. 
Between June 2017 and the first recorded instance of IS using CW in July 2014, IHS Conflict Monitoring has 
logged 71 instances of CW use attributed to IS.[1] This ‘relatively routine’ use of CW by a non-state actor  is 
unprecedented – the Tamil Tigers used chlorine once and Aum Shinrikyo, despite producing its own sarin, 
only conducted 10 CW attacks.[2] Fortunately, most of IS’ CW attacks have involved low level agents, either 
chlorine or (the relatively impotent) mustard gas; while they can cause panic and create significant numbers 
of casualties, there have been few fatalities.[3] Nevertheless, this frequent use of CW is in stark contrast to 
previous Al-Qaida (AQ) actions: while AQ core explored CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) 
options, they were never featured in an AQ core attack.[4] It will be argued that this shift towards the frequent 
use of CW by IS represents a long running strategic difference between AQ and IS.[5] To allow for a controlled 
comparison, this article will compare the use of CW by IS to its lack of use by AQ’s Syrian affiliate, Al-Nusra. As 
much of the literature on non-state actor’s use of CBRN focuses on the type of the group involved (e.g. religious 
cults, ethno-nationalists, etc.), this article will highlight factors that, in this case, caused two ostensibly similar 
groups to develop differences in CW usage.[6]
Given the politicised nature of CW within the Syrian context, statements relating to the attribution of CW 
attacks are controversial; however, there is a lack of evidence proving that Al-Nusra have been using CW.[7] 
There was an incident in Turkey in 2013 where it was initially reported that Al-Nusra operatives had been 
arrested with 2.5 kg of sarin in their possession, but Turkish government statements later claimed that the seized 
chemicals were antifreeze.[8] While one of the detainees was eventually convicted in absentia for membership 
of Al-Nusra, further details remain unclear.[9] Videos have emerged of rebels supposedly using CW, but their 
authenticity and origin is highly dubious.[10] Additionally, the Assad regime has frequently accused Al-Nusra 
of being responsible for CW incidents, although these have yet to be evidenced by an international body.[11] 
In the case of Talmenes on the 21st April 2014, the Joint Investigative Mechanism found the Assad regime 
responsible, despite its attempt to blame Al-Nusra.[12] In contrast to IS, where a repeated and well documented 
pattern of usage can be observed, there is insufficient evidence to claim that Al-Nusra have been using CW.[13] 
Rather than assessing Al-Nusra’s potential acquisition of advanced CW, the apparent distinct difference in 
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usage between Al-Nusra and IS will be analysed.
A further point of contention would be the dimensions of the relationship between Al-Nusra and AQ core. As 
Al-Nusra’s initial founders were long term members of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), tasked with founding a 
Syrian branch in 2011, Al-Nusra’s relationship with AQ has clearly evolved over time.[14] Al-Nusra’s relative 
success as it shifted from terrorism to insurgency led to disagreements between Al-Nusra and ISI over the 
demarcation of authority; by 2013 this had created a schism between the two groups.[15] This power struggle 
with ISI led Al-Nusra to align with AQ. In 2013, Al-Nusra integrated “at least two dozen senior al-Qaida 
leaders” into its leadership, thereby solidifying AQ core’s influence over the organisation as its regional affiliate.
[16] While the ‘toxicity’ of the AQ ‘brand’ has since led Al-Nusra to publicly distance itself from AQ in the 
intervening period and undergo a name change, analyst Charles Lister advices that “any potential decision to 
break ties from Al-Qaida should be read more as a politically smart maneuver”, rather than a genuine split.[17] 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the shifts in the ongoing relationship between AQ and 
Al-Nusra, what is pertinent to the following analysis is that Al-Nusra have thus far conformed to a gradualist 
strategy in line with al-Zawahiri’s ‘General Guidelines for Jihad’, rather than the uncompromising antagonism 
of IS.[18] How this strategy will develop as Al-Nusra becomes increasingly dominant within the Syrian 
rebel cause is yet to be seen; a departure from its previous approach can be seen with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s 
antagonism towards Ahrar al-Sham.[19]
The shifting nature of Al-Nusra’s strategy indicates a further limitation of this study when used to extrapolate 
future CBRN behaviour, especially in different operational contexts. While IS have proven their willingness 
to use CW both locally and abroad, it will be argued that Al-Nusra have thus far deliberately restricted their 
terroristic activities for strategic reasons. If Al-Nusra, other AQ franchises, or AQ core itself redoubled their 
efforts to conduct attacks in the West, they would be less constrained by the need to convince local Sunni 
populations of the righteousness of their cause. Nevertheless, as effective CW use is dependent on know-how, 
it is unlikely that external operations cells will use CW without prior experience or direction. [20]
A final limitation of this article that dictates the employment of this wider comparative approach is the lack 
of communication from within each organisation explaining their approaches towards the employment of 
CBRN. While both IS and AQ core have communicated their desire for CBRN weapons, available discussion 
on how or if they would be used is even more limited; for AQ, this is seemingly because they have never had 
a CBRN weapon that they deemed operationally viable.[21] For IS and its precursor organisations, it is more 
complicated; despite chlorine attacks that occurred in Baghdad in 2006-2007 being commonly attributed to 
AQI and IS currently using CW, none of these actions have been publicly announced.[22] IS’ propaganda 
magazines only fleetingly mention CW, and then only in the context of Assad’s use and in a negative light.[23] 
Charles Lister quotes a lone IS militant who stated on his personal blog that IS have been using CW, but given 
IS’ record for communicating its extreme brutality openly, this relative silence is a surprising omission.[24] 
 
Similarities 
In terms of contrasting why two ostensibly similar Salafist Jihadist organisations have demonstrated different 
patterns of CW use, the split between IS and Al-Nusra lends itself towards a controlled comparison. When 
it comes to practical limitations for inhibiting CW usage, both groups have had the opportunity to conduct 
basic CW attacks.[25] As both Al-Nusra and IS have had control over territory they are free to operate with 
relative impunity compared to a cell based terrorist group in a hostile state. Control over territory has also 
meant easy access to chlorine which is used ubiquitously for sanitation. In December 2012, Al-Nusra captured 
the SYSACCO plant near Aleppo and reportedly removed 200 tonnes of chlorine.[26] Similarly, IS allegedly 
appropriated chlorine from water treatment facilities in territory it held.[27] Furthermore, little technical 
knowledge is required to weaponize chlorine in its most basic form; although inefficient, chlorine canisters can 
be combined with conventional IEDs for an improvised dispersal mechanism.[28] Although this crude usage is 
unlikely to significantly enhance the lethality of an IED, it stands that a limited CW capacity has been available 
to both IS and Al-Nusra.
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While IS has gone on to manufacture its own “makeshift [CW] projectiles and mortar rounds” and use mustard 
gas, possibly either scavenged from the Muthanna facility or produced themselves, access to a more advanced 
CW capability was not a driver for IS’ initial usage of CW.[29] Whereas expertise has been highlighted as a 
driving factor for non-state actors’ use in the CBRN literature, IS used chlorine before mustard in 2014 and 
had been planning CW use in Baghdad in 2013.[30] Although the incorporation of know-how from foreign 
recruited members and former Baathist scientists may have helped IS improve their CW capability, access to 
advanced materials or expertise is not a sufficient explanation for the use of CW for either group, but may 
have been perpetuating IS use by improving its tactical utility.[31] Nevertheless, IS’ precursor organisations’ 
preoccupation with using CW, both in 2013 and 2006-2007 when they were attempting to acquire it under Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, demonstrates a longstanding interest in CW that predates their now unprecedented access 
to former Baathist expertise.[32]
In terms of potential justifications for use of CW, both Al-Nusra and IS have reportedly had chlorine and sarin 
used against them by the Assad regime. This has included IS having chlorine used against them at Der-Ezzor 
in 2014 and sarin allegedly used on villages under their control in December 2016.[33] For Al-Nusra, chlorine 
was reportedly repeatedly used against villages they occupied in the Hama plain in 2014 and then sarin was 
used against Khan Sheikhoun in April 2017.[34] However, no connection emerges between use of CW on 
the two groups and a response in kind. In their present incarnation, IS was plotting use of CW in Iraq 2013 
and used chlorine IEDs in 2014, before CW was used against them in Syria.[35] On the other hand, Al-Nusra 
has explicitly retaliated against the Assad regime for the use of sarin on Ghouta. Al-Nusra executed hostages, 
launched bombings and conducted conventional attacks but there was no apparent use of CW in return during 
its “eye for an eye” campaign.[36] With IS starting to use CW in Iraq and Al-Nusra responding to CW with 
conventional means, retaliation or even a permissive environment generated by wider CW use is clearly not a 
driving factor behind CW usage by IS or Al-Nusra. 
As Salafist Jihadist organisations, both Al-Nusra and IS can find theological justification for the use of CW 
through the use of the same fatwas. While Al-Nusra have never publicly communicated a desire for CBRN 
and therefore have never needed to provide a reasoning themselves, they could draw on prior AQ statements 
issued either by Bin Laden, al-Awlaki or Zawahiri that provide a justification for mass casualty terrorism.[37] 
Although IS have stated that they would hypothetically use a nuclear device on the US, they could additionally 
cite Nasir al-Fahd’s 2003 fatwa on the use of CBRN, especially given his defection to IS in 2015.[38] IS could 
also draw upon the practices of their ideological progenitor, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had said he would 
use CBRN weapons if he had them.[39] Therefore, for either Al-Nusra of IS, their ideology imposes no direct 
limitations on the use of mass casualty terrorism or CBRN use.
Essential Difference
Rather than an ideological conflict as such, the core doctrinal difference that has led to fighting between Al-
Nusra and IS is the prioritisation with which the caliphate is founded. While both Bin Laden, Zawahiri and 
senior Al-Nusra members believed in “the pursuit of a caliphate,” this was the end goal of their struggle.[40] 
On the other hand, Zarqawi, AQI in 2006-2007 and then al-Baghdadi in 2014  all sought to found the caliphate 
at the earliest practical opportunity.[41] In 2014, the foundation of the caliphate had practical benefits within 
the enflamed power struggle between Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida on the one side and the then Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the other.[42] The implication of founding a caliphate is that all jihadists should 
pledge their bay‘a (oath of allegiance) to the caliph rather than Zawahiri; not doing so is a clear signal of 
expressing its illegitimacy and therefore declaring yourself its enemy.[43] Al-Tamimi has argued that “[IS’] 
fundamental problem in dealing with other rebel factions… [is because it] sees itself not merely as a “group”… 
but as a “state” that has the prerogative to rule over all others… [and therefore] adopts a particularly brutal 
approach to dealing with other rebel factions.”[44]
This uncompromising stance is further reflected both in IS’ (and its previous incarnation’s) attitude towards what 
it perceives as heresy and religious bad practice. In this regard, IS’ approach to salafi-jihadism has been described 
as “absolutely uncompromising,” even compared to fellow jihadists.[45] IS is willing to attack perceived deviant 
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Sunni Muslims under its takfiri doctrine and seeks to immediately overthrow secular authority in favour of the 
harsh application of its interpretation of Sharia law.[46] IS have a long running history of practicing extreme 
violence towards Shia Muslims and other religious minorities; not only is this ideologically justified within 
their framework, but attacking Shia Muslims served the purpose within Zarqawi’s original strategy of igniting 
a sectarian conflict in Iraq.[47] Brutal violence in the form of mass casualty terrorism and beheadings were 
therefore instrumental in this pursuit.
The use of CW therefore fits well within IS’ strategy that seeks to leverage maximum violence. While the use 
of crude CW may not produce as many casualties as conventional options, previous CW attacks have been 
noted for their ability to impart “a pervasive sense of fear and insecurity.”[48] This is aptly demonstrated by 
AQI’s chlorine campaign in 2006-2007; as punishment for Sunni tribes’ attempts at expelling AQI from the area 
in the ‘Anbar Awakening’, AQI launched a series of reprisal attacks.[49] While the majority of AQI’s actions 
consisted of increasingly lethal shootings and conventional bombings, their 19 chlorine enhanced vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices acted as supplementary terror weapons.[50] As the chlorine itself only 
inflicted injuries, Zanders claims that their use was “designed more to augment [AQI’s]…fearsome reputation 
in order to subdue a population.”[51]
While this tactic was abandoned in 2007, either for its inefficiency or simply as AQI was expelled from Anbar, 
ISI resumed the use of CW in July 2014.[52] This situates the resumption of CW attacks in the middle of 
ISIL’s rapid rise to prominence in the summer of 2014. With territory to collect material from, ISIL had every 
incentive to attempt to use chlorine to inspire further fear; CW use could potentially inspire fresh routs, which 
had been the source of ISIL’s success in their military campaign to that point.[53] Although ISI’s success in using 
CW in this regard is difficult to quantify, their use of CW for its “psychological impact” has been noted.[54] 
While IS has not explicitly communicated its rationale for CW use, Novenario has revealed through content 
analysis of IS’ propaganda magazines that they placed a heavy emphasis on intimidation of their opposition 
during this period.[55]
As IS has declared its unending hostility towards both kafir and takfiri alike, it has little to lose diplomatically 
from using CW.[56] As IS operates outside of international norms and institutions, there are few costs that the 
international community could impose above armed intervention, which IS initially welcomed.[57] The only 
barrier one could infer inhibiting its open communication over its CW use would be an avoidance of offending 
its potential recruits, given the status of CW within the Syrian conflict.[58] 
While IS’ chemical weapons capability increased between 2014 to 2017, the frequency with which it now uses 
CW is rapidly in decline.[59] The pocketing and then loss of Mosul, combined with coalition action against 
IS’ CW sites appears to have stymied IS’ CW deployment and development.[60] As IS’ territorial holdings 
decline, there have been repeated warnings over the possibility of external CW terrorism.[61] Such scenarios 
have already manifested with a failed chlorine bombing in Indonesia in 2015 and an IS cell being dismantled 
in Morocco while in possession of an improvised CW cache.[62] In July 2017, Australian authorities disrupted 
an IS cell reportedly planning to deploy an improvised hydrogen sulphide dispersal device.[63] Notably, the 
alleged perpetrators were receiving both targeting and technical direction from IS handlers in Syria, although 
they remained “a long way from having a functional device” at the point of their arrests.[64]
If IS’ abiding strategic approach can be characterised by the use of intimidation, Al-Nusra’s can be summarised 
as a “strategy of gradualism” wherein both their revolutionary allies and the population under their control are 
slowly introduced to their brand of Salafi Islam.[65] This approach is in line with Abu Musab Al-Suri’s jihadist 
theorisations which “prioritizes popular support above all other objectives.”[66] After shifting from primarily 
terroristic tactics in 2012, Al-Nusra capitalised upon its influence which it had gained through its battlefield 
prowess to provide civil services to rebel-controlled territory.[67] The relative “efficiency and non-corrupt 
nature” of its administration provided further influence to the organisation.[68] This created a virtuous cycle, 
whereby their administration increased  popularity, which attracted more recruits which, in turn, bolstered 
their military capabilities and influence yet further.[69] The success of this diplomatic and civil approach can 
be seen by how it leveraged popular support to bolster condemnation for both its designation as a terrorist 
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organisation by the US in 2012 and then again against an airstrike conducted against its fledgling external 
operations Khorasan cell.[70] On the other hand, Al-Nusra’s continuing military ability was demonstrated 
through its coordination of rebel effort to capture Idlib in 2015.[71]
Because of this local prioritisation and moves towards consolidating popular support, CBRN usage would be 
detrimental to this doctrine. Al-Nusra’s leader, Jolani reportedly received direct instructions from Zawahiri to 
cease planning attacks on the West and to continue to “better integrate” his movement into the Syrian opposition.
[72] Al-Nusra has since sought to both legitimise itself by disavowing AQ in order to potentially receive external 
assistance while also further ingraining itself within the Syrian revolution to provide protection from foreign 
intervention.[73] Mass casualty attacks outside of the region or attempts to use CBRN would jeopardise this 
approach. Both courses of action could potentially provide the pretext for greater armed intervention against 
the group, especially for CW use, given its highly politicised context within the Syrian Civil War.[74] 
Much as with IS and its precursor organisation’s longstanding interest in CW being aligned with their strategy, 
Al-Nusra’s non-incorporation of CW reflects longstanding trends within AQ’s doctrine. While “al-Qaida’s 
leadership decided to pursue WMD primarily as a deterrent” in the 1990s under the directorship of Zawahiri, 
western intervention in the Middle East “changed the reality of the region.”[75] Zawahiri initially sought to 
justify the use of WMD after 9/11, but no use has been forthcoming.[76] This reflected that only a basic CW 
capability was available to AQ and its use was not deemed operationally viable or even desirable; Zawahiri 
allegedly cancelled a plot that would have seen a crude hydrogen cyanide device used on the New York subway 
in order to obtain something “better”.[77]
AQ core’s shift towards a gradualist approach to jihad coincides with, and was likely spurred by, the failure of 
AQI to successfully capitalise on the American occupation of Iraq.[78] As AQI’s violence in Iraq worsened, 
Zawahiri wrote a letter to Zarqawi asking him to refrain from his more brutal practices towards Shia Muslims. 
Notably, Zawahiri’s letter was couched in terms of pragmatism rather than religious justification.[79] This was 
again reiterated in 2013 when Zawahiri issued his ‘General Guidelines for Jihad’ which emphasised that while 
attacking the West would remain their “foremost duty”, “[their] struggle is a long one, and Jihad is in need 
of safe bases.”[80] Therefore, Zawahiri advised avoiding conflict with local regimes unless necessary and the 
combined employment of operational restraint and propaganda to sway local Sunni populations.[81]  Due 
to the necessity of co-opting local conflicts within the wider struggle against the “western Zionist-Crusader 
alliance,” it can be inferred that CBRN weapons would play little immediate role as they would invite premature 
armed intervention and dissuade the local population from cooperating; as a result it is unsurprising that they 
are not mentioned within this framework. It is therefore notable that “Jabhat al-Nusra…has emerged as… 
[the] first successful test case” of AQ’s gradualist approach, notably in the absence of CBRN threats or use, 
in sharp contrast to IS.[82] Therefore, the difference in CW usage patterns between IS and al-Nusra is best 
explained by “strategic constraints” inherent within their differing doctrines rather than an aversion to CW or 
environmental factors.[83]
 
Ongoing Concern
While the potential for continuing use of CW by IS in Syria and elsewhere is clear, Al-Nusra’s strategic restraint 
is not perpetually sustainable. As it has come to dominate the remains of the Syrian opposition, its relative 
strength allows it to be  assertive as seen through its recent aggression towards Ahrar al-Sham.[84] If Al-Nusra’s 
influence continues to grow, it may feel comfortable in dropping its pretence of cooperation and engaging in 
terrorism abroad while it has the opportunity. As Al-Nusra has no discernible ideological qualms against using 
CBRN, it may engage in CW terrorism as part of this effort. Whether Al-Nusra would engage in terrorism 
abroad is uncertain, given that Zawahiri now rebukes the group for its ongoing attachment to “regionalism” 
and its attempts to “[deceive] America, which cannot be deceived as they wish to deceive it” by portraying 
themselves as local revolutionaries.[85] On the other hand, the recent defections of several opposition elements 
out of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham coalition and the indecisive outcome of its September Hama offensive indicate 
a negative outlook to Al-Nusra’s position within the Syrian conflict.[86] If this trend continues and it were to 
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become the focus of government offensives, desperate circumstances may prompt Al-Nusra CW usage in Syria.
While IS as an organisation is broadly in decline, a further concern stemming from their use of CW is that it 
could disseminate its knowledge regarding its CW developments, thereby further enabling future proliferation 
and use. Until now, available jihadist guidance on the manufacture of CW has remained crude and has not 
advanced significantly from the “Mubtakar” device.[87] This potential hazard was clearly highlighted by the 
efforts of an IS “controller” to direct the Australian cell disrupted in July 2017 to use CW in mass casualty 
terrorism.[88] If training materials on improvised CW devices were further refined and distributed, IS could 
have a pronounced and continuing impact on jihadi CBRN terrorism. 
 
Conclusion
To conclude, this article has sought to demonstrate that the differing pattern of CW usage between IS and Al-
Nusra is inadequately explained by several commonly offered drivers of non-state actor CBRN use. Instead, 
the driving factor behind why two similarly motivated groups exhibit differences in CW use is best explained 
by a doctrinal difference that has far reaching strategic implications. For IS, the desire to found the Caliphate 
at the earliest practical opportunity and the need to stoke sectarian conflict has driven them to embrace a 
brutal strategy within which CW has clear utility. Conversely, Al-Nusra embraced a gradualist strategy that 
has been forwarded by core AQ. As a result, it has sought to co-opt the Syrian opposition by achieving popular 
acclaim through non-corrupt administration and battlefield success. Terrorist attacks on foreign targets and 
the use of CW would endanger this effort. However, as Al-Nusra comes to dominate the remnants of the Syrian 
opposition, this restrain may not hold. From this perspective, “[the] use of chemical weapons” should not be 
viewed as “just one more area where al Zarqawi’s followers have surpassed their brethren in Al-Qaida,” but 
rather as the manifestation of differing strategies which have each enjoyed success within their own respective 
frameworks.[89]
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